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Abstract 
We apply game theory to explore mechanisms promoting international transfer of low-carbon technologies under 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This article employs a model framework of 
double auction analyst the low efficiency of international transfer of low-carbon, to find out the reasons for the 
formation of this phenomenon and to develop corresponding policy . Pointed out that only the international 
community and the concerted efforts between countries can resolve the low efficiency of the transfer. 
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1. Introduction 
This summer, when Kaka and Ronaldo in p reparing fo r the World Cup in South Africa, wearing  yellow 
uniforms is made of eight discarded Coke bottles. Back in the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, Coca -Cola 
has made a number of "green" T-shirt give Olympic athletes, T-shirt sleeve is very interesting to read, "5 
bottles inside". 
September 13, the Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange and the U.S. Pacific Carbon Exchange 
signed a cooperation agreement in Shanghai to jointly build the first low -carbon and clean technology 
cooperation in Sino-US platform. It is reported that Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange has 
been committed to the promotion of low carbon and clean technology and application, since its inception 
has contributed billions of dollars worth of low carbon and clean technology transfer, and also set up a 
South-South environment and energy trading system, to establish an international clean technology and 
low-carbon technology transfer platform to address global climate change and make the effort. The 
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cooperation with the United States will effect ively promote the Sino-US and international transfer of low 
carbon and clean technology and applications. 
Low carbon economy, one is a positive commitment to environmental responsibility, to complete the 
requirements of the national energy saving targets; the other is to adjust the economic struc ture, improve 
energy efficiency, development of new industries, build an ecological civilization. 
2. Construction of model 
2.1 Game variables 
In order to analyze the game process of the low-carbon technology in the International transfer, we 
analyze the game variables in the technology transfer process firstly: 
x Player 
Unlike commodity market, the characteristics of a given technology in the operation of low-carbon 
technology market is the secret of the few open, which caused a certain degree of difficulty o f finding 
buyers and sellers. In general, patents can only be obtained from only one company, there will be a 
corresponding number of similar alternatives. So, a low-carbon technology, the numbers of the supply 
side and demand side are very limited.  
x Strategies 
From the perspective of a deal,  two part icipants have two operations for choose. The seller (the 
developed country) can choose the action is {Transfer, Not transfer}, and the buyer (the developing 
country) can choose the action is {Accept, Not accept}. After the seller gives the asking price, the buyer 
develops their own guidelines for action based on their judgment to the value of the technical knowledge. 
The buyer choose ”Not accept” when the asking price was higher than their judgment; and choose 
“Accept” when the asking price was equal to or less than their judgment. The seller was so.  
x Information 
In the technology transfer process, both participants have a degree of information asymmetry. Buyers 
does not understand the seller’s asking price of the technological achievements, and their own level of 
maturity to technical knowledge, and even does not predict the seller’s effort level when it shows the 
technology. Seller does not know the buyer's offer of technical knowledge, and its honesty. Therefore , one 
can not fully understand the other's informat ion in the process of technology transfer. Game of low -carbon 
technology transfer process is incomplete informat ion game. Because the number of buyers and sellers of 
technology than the number of part icipants in most goods trade less, the price is uncertainty. Any party, 
especially the buyer, does not have a clear concept about the value of technology [1]. 
x Payoff 
In the game of low-carbon technology transfer process, the preference of seller and buyer is fo r 
maximum effectiveness. Not only wishes the buyer the seller’s bid  is not less than the cost, but also want 
to get higher profits than the cost. Only wishes the buyer the seller's asking price is not higher than his 
offer, but also hopes to get more rest [2]. 
2.2 Game model 
Double auction model is a simple model of incomplete in formation static game, and was established by 
Chatterjee and Samuelson [3], We use this model to analyze the low-carbon technology transfer game 
process. According to Chatterjee and Samuelson, the double auction is a special case of incomplete 
informat ion static game. We put the issuer of technology as a transfer, those receiving the technology as a 
transferee, and the technology itself as a special commodity. In the double auction, the transfer and 
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transferee offer the price in the same time, the transfer proposed asking price and the transferee proposed 
offer, and then select the price P to liquidate the market [4]. The seller determined an asking price
sp , and 
the buyer given an offer bp  in the same t ime. If b sp pt , then the transaction carry on with  the 
price
2
b sp pp  ; Transaction does not occur if b sp p . 
The buyer's valuation of the low-carbon technology is bv , and the seller’s valuation is sv , valuations of 
both are private informat ion, and they are subjected to [0,1] uniform d istribution. If the transaction is 
successful, the buyer’s utility is bv p ; if transaction failed, the utility of buyer is 0.  The same is true fo r 
the seller, if the transaction is successful, the seller’s utility is
sp v , otherwise, it is 0. 
In this static Bayes ian game, buyer’s strategy is function ( )b bp v , it defines that the purchase price will 
be given by buyer under each possible type. Similarly, seller’s strategy is function ( )s sp v , it defines that 
the asking price will be given by seller in the case of different valuations . If bp and sp  meet the 
following two conditions, { ( )b bp v , ( )s sp v } strategy combination is the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: 
ĉ . For the buyer’s every valuation bv in the interval of [0,1] , the offer ( )b bp v should meet  
^ `E[ ( ) | ( )]max ( )
2b
b s s b s s
b b s sp
p p v p p v
v P p p v t­ ½ t® ¾¯ ¿
                                                        (1) 
here, factor ^ `( )b s sP p p vt said the probability of trading success when the offer is bp , 
and E[ ( ) | ( )]
2
b s s b s sp p v p p v t said the successful trading price. E[ ( ) | ( )]s s b s sp v p p vt said the 
expectation of the asking price when offer is not less than the asking price. 
Ċ . For the seller’s every valuation sv in the interval of [0,1], the sp should meet 
^ `E[ ( ) | ( ) ]max ( )
2s
s b b b b s
s b b sp
p p v p v p
v P p v p t­ ½ t® ¾¯ ¿
                                                       (2) 
here, factor ^ `( )b b sP p v pt said the probability of trading success when the asking price is sp , 
and E[ ( ) | ( ) ]
2
s b b b b sp p v p v p t said the successful trading price.  
Suppose the seller and the buyer's bidding strategies are a linear function of their valuation, t he bid by 
the linear strategy. Set                                                                                                       
( )s s s s sp v vD E  ,     sE >0                                                                                                                    (3) 
( )b b b b bp v vD E  ,     bE >0                                                                                                                   (4) 
because bv and sv are subjected to [0, 1] uniform distribution, we can calculate formula (1) and (2): 
^ ` ^ `( ) b s b sb s s b s s s s
s s
p pP p p v P p v P v D DD E E E
­ ½ t  t   d  ® ¾¯ ¿
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similarly, 
1
max
2 2b
s b b s
b bp
s
p p
v p D DE
­  ½ § · ® ¾¨ ¸© ¹¯ ¿
                                                                                               (5) 
1
max
2 2s
b b s b b s
s sp
b
p pp vD E D EE
­   ½  § ·  ® ¾¨ ¸© ¹¯ ¿
                                                                            (6) 
calculate the formula (5) and (6), obtained respectively 
1 2
3 3b s bp vD  ,    1 23 3s b b sp vD E                                                                                              (7) 
by comparison, we can obtain that 14sD  , 23sE  , 112bD  , 23bE  , that is 
2 1
3 4( )s s sp v v   ,   2 13 12( )b b bp v v                                                                                                   (8) 
Formula (8) is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium under the assumption of linear strategy. The condition of 
transaction is b sp pt , equivalent situation is 14b sv vt  .Therefore, the possibility of transactions in 
both linear strategies offers isƸABC in Fig.1. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Bids of seller and buyer in linear strategies 
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the possibility of transactions is 56.25%, it is not high[5]. 
 
3. Analysis and Policy Recommendations  
3.1 Game variables 
The above result indicates that the international transactions of low-carbon technologies are not 
efficient. This result is caused by several reasons. 
x Uncertainty of changes in knowledge 
The fact that changing the behavior of human beings is very difficult. As early as 1992 the United 
Nations "Agenda 21" on the proposed initiative to change consumption patterns, but still no success could 
be replicated. In addition, how to coordinate the market  economy of demand -driven and stressed the 
saving of life, the basic theory of economics has not yet resolved. 
x Uncertainty of technological innovation and technology transfer 
Low-carbon development is inseparable from the support of advanced technologies. Efforts of 
Countries increase investments in low-carbon technology, and how the low-carbon achievements into 
mature products, will directly determine the technical feasibility of achieving low-carbon development of 
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China. Moreover, developed countries could be as soon as their advanced low-carbon technology transfers 
to developing countries, there are large uncertainties. 
x Uncertainty of low-carbon funding 
Fund is to achieve protection of low carbon development. Low -carbon development for China to 
achieve an annual increase to RMB1 trillion or more additional investments. There is a big uncertainty for 
How to raise these funds. 
3.2 Policy recommendations 
x The international community 
The international community should speed up the negotiation process of climate obligations, especially 
in the Bali Road Map negotiations and actively push forward the creat ion of the field of climate change 
"Technical Cooperation Protocol", under "the Convention", propose the obligations of developed 
countries measurable, reportable and  verifiab le technology transfer, to  provide technolog y transfer by 
developed countries to achieve quantified emissions reduction in developing countries. Such mandatory 
protocol has two specific ways: first, though negotiations, directly determine the developed countries’ 
obligations of achieved quantitative emission reduction through technology transfer, urge developed 
countries to develop appropriate policies to promote technology transfer of specific. The second, through 
negotiations, "Covenant" is established a separate funding mechanism for technology transfer, set up a 
special technology transfer fund. Developed countries to provide funding through the task-sharing, funded 
by the Fund directly related to the transfer of low carbon technologies [6]. 
x Government 
Strengthen the legal and institutional construction. Technology shares should improve the legal norms, 
the establishment of intangible assets evaluation system, holding technical personnel management system, 
reward  system and other technology development, strengthening intellectual property protectio n and the 
important role of the standard form with the international practice in order to protect intellectual property 
rights as the core distribution system and operating system. Support the establishment of Sino -foreign 
cooperative research and development institutions, training of talents, built to adapt to the development of 
low carbon technology industry technical experts, managers and entrepreneurs to explore various forms of 
carbon and technical personnel of international training and exchange mode. 
Through tax incentives, financing offers and other incentives to guide the government and relevant 
enterprises to increase low-carbon technology research and development investment. 
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